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APPRAISAL  ARBITRAGE:  IN  CASE  OF  EMERGENCY,
BREAK  GLASS
Malaina J. Weldy*
“But may not the existence of just such a[n] [appraisal] right—a switch
which will be pulled only in case of emergency—be desirable[?]”1
INTRODUCTION
For most of its history, academics considered the statutory right to
appraisal a sleepy, burdensome remedy with little to no economic value.2  Yet
as the contemporary uptick in appraisal filings and scholarship indicate, this
once idle remedy has seen a rebirth in the past decade—to the consternation
of many.3  Indeed, appraisal in Delaware has shifted from a seldom used anti-
dote to corporate law’s majority rule to a new form of short-term investment
strategy dubbed “appraisal arbitrage.”4  Appraisal arbitrage occurs when
large investors, typically hedge funds,5 purchase shares of a company after
the announcement of a merger in order to contest the sufficiency of the deal
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2019; Candidate for Master of
Business Administration, University of Notre Dame Mendoza College of Business, 2019;
Bachelor of Arts in Business, Goshen College, 2016.  I would like to thank Professor Julian
Velasco for his helpful substantive and stylistic feedback on this Note, and the members of
the Notre Dame Law Review for their skillful edits.  I also owe a special thanks to my dad for
being the first to teach me the law, and for showing me what it means to live each day as a
different kind of lawyer.  All errors are my own.
1 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern
Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 85–86 (1969).
2 In the 1960s and 1970s, scholars for the most part dismissed or “heaped scorn” on
the remedy, including—most notably—Yale Law Professor Bayless Manning, who
described appraisal as “of virtually no economic advantage to the usual shareholder except
in highly specialized situations.”  Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and
the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1560 (2015) (quoting Bayless
Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 260
(1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 See, e.g., Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, 41
DEL. J. CORP. L. 279, 282–84 (2017). See generally Korsmo & Myers, supra note 2, at
1560–66.
4 Wei Jiang et al., Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy or Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 J.L. & ECON.
697, 701 (2016).
5 Id. at 698.
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price and hopefully get more consideration for their shares.6  Under Dela-
ware’s appraisal statute,7 any shareholder—even an abhorred appraisal arbi-
trageur—has an absolute right to appraisal in certain types of merger
transactions, provided they meet the procedural requirements of the
statute.8
Although appraisal petitions only represent about “one out of every
twenty merger-related lawsuits,”9 the recent explosion of the remedy has
drawn attention and criticism from all sides.  Many scholars—and especially
practitioners—contend appraisal arbitrage is “rent-seeking,”10 unnecessarily
increases transaction costs,11 and is generally of little to no social value.12
Some even worry that it will eventually turn into a form of “nuisance litiga-
tion,” if it is not that already.13
Yet the fundamental critique of appraisal arbitrage focuses not necessa-
rily on the costs it imposes or the judicial resources it consumes, but rather
on the misalignment between the strategy as currently utilized and the his-
toric purpose of the remedy—providing liquidity for shareholders who, with-
out a veto right, are forced to receive an “illiquid instrument.”14  Indeed,
appraisal arbitrageurs typically purchase their shares after the announcement
of a merger, choosing to buy into the transaction rather than looking for an
escape hatch out.15  Although this is certainly not the way in which the stat-
ute was originally designed to be utilized,16 this criticism largely overlooks
one of the main goals of stockholder litigation: deterrence.17  As most schol-
ars agree that the more emergent purpose of the appraisal remedy is to pro-
tect minority shareholders from being compelled to accept less than the fair
value of their shares,18 having a large, sophisticated party in the wings who is
able to bring suit absent a fair price is powerful.  In this sense, what looks like
opportunistic behavior by arbitrageurs might actually be socially desirable.
This Note argues two points, each fairly modest in ambition.  First, it
suggests that appraisal is a justified and desirable remedy, despite the unde-
6 Jay B. Kesten, The Uncertain Case for Appraisal Arbitrage, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89,
89 (2017).
7 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2016).
8 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 9.43 (3d ed. 2017).
9 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 282.
10 Desiree M. Baca, Note, Curbing Arbitrage: The Case for Reappraisal of Delaware’s
Appraisal Rights, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 425, 427 (2017).
11 Stanley Onyeador, Note, The Chancery Bank of Delaware: Appraisal Arbitrageurs Expose
Need to Further Reform Defective Appraisal Statute, 70 VAND. L. REV. 339, 375 (2017).
12 Trevor Norwitz, A Debate: Is the Delaware Appraisal Rights Remedy in Need of Repair?,
BUS. L. TODAY, Jan. 2017, at 1, 1–2.
13 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 2, at 1600.
14 Kesten, supra note 6, at 93.
15 Id. at 110.
16 See infra Section I.B.
17 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 317.
18 See 4 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 22:24 (3d ed. 2016).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-5\NDL514.txt unknown Seq: 3 18-JUL-18 7:29
2018] appraisal  arbitrage 2193
sirability of appraisal petitioners in recent years.  In a world that loves to root
for the underdog, no matter the circumstances,19 arbitrageurs are the antith-
esis.  Yet if we accept that today appraisal is at its core about deterrence and
protecting minority shareholders, then it should not matter who is bringing
the suit, so long as it is meritorious.20  As there is evidence that appraisal
arbitrage continues to benefit shareholders, especially ex ante, there is little
reason for the Delaware legislature to adopt additional requirements meant
to keep out the arbitrageurs who are bringing these cases.
Second, this Note argues that although Delaware’s contemporary trend
toward using merger price as the best evidence of fair value—in auction set-
tings where there was publicly available information and arm’s-length deal-
ing—should, in conjunction with the 2016 amendments to the appraisal
statute, eliminate many of the concerns about unmeritorious appraisal litiga-
tion, there are nevertheless potential issues with such a trend.  Specifically,
this Note argues that to the extent this trend indicates a greater skepticism of
alternative valuation methods, even in suspect transactions, there is a risk
that the court will too often simply return the merger price as fair value,
disincentivizing even meritorious appraisal petitions and harming the deter-
rence value of the remedy.  Accordingly, this Note suggests appointing a neu-
tral expert to arbitrate valuation disputes (specifically when examining
Discounted Cash Flow models), which could offer the court some much
needed reliability and increase the likelihood that alternative valuation meth-
ods will be used instead of the merger price.
Part I of this Note introduces the appraisal remedy, outlining its history,
purpose, and modern justifications.  It also details the procedural process for
bringing an appraisal claim.  Part II examines the rise of appraisal in its cur-
rent arbitrage form, delving into the various reasons set forth to explain its
rise, as well as how the recent amendments to the Delaware appraisal statute
have addressed these issues.  This Part also analyzes Delaware’s recent
merger price “presumption” trend.  Part III puts forth several arguments in
light of this trend, with the intent that such arguments will both justify and
protect the remedy’s deterrence value.  This is followed by a brief conclusion.
I. APPRAISAL IN DELAWARE: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
This Part provides a brief overview of appraisal rights and the appraisal
process in order to offer the reader a foundation for understanding the cur-
rent appraisal debate.  Although much could be said about the appraisal
remedy from a historical standpoint,21 this Note seeks to address appraisal as
it is currently utilized given that the remedy’s trajectory has changed drasti-
cally over time.  This Part lays the groundwork for several justifications and
19 See Daniel Engber, The Underdog Effect, SLATE (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.slate
.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2010/04/the_underdog_effect.html.
20 See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 316.
21 For a historical overview before the recent sea change in appraisal, see generally
Manning, supra note 2.
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defenses of the appraisal remedy, which will become relevant to the argu-
ments in Part III.
A. The Role and History of Appraisal
Historically, merger approval required the unanimous consent of all
stockholders.22  The rationale for unanimity was that purchasing stock in a
firm gave you a contract right, and thus the stockholder’s approval was neces-
sary before you could divest him of that right.23  Unanimity, however,
allowed just a single shareholder to prevent a majority-approved merger from
going forward, creating a holdup problem for corporations across the United
States.24  Yet as Professors James Cox and Thomas Hazen note, “[b]ecause of
the importance of contract and property rights, courts [initially] held grave
doubts regarding the constitutionality of permitting corporate actions over
the protest of any single shareholder.”25  Indeed, the skepticism of corporate
consolidations and mergers was reflected in an opera at the time, which had
the line: “Is it worse to rob a bank than merge a bank?”26  Nevertheless, as
the holdout problem persisted, the courts’ concern quickly gave way to prac-
ticality.  Pennsylvania was the first state to provide an appraisal remedy to a
minority, dissenting shareholder in a merger,27 and other states eventually
followed suit.28  Delaware, the state around which most of corporate law cen-
ters, enacted its appraisal statute in 1899.29
The original purpose of appraisal was “to compensate stockholders for
the loss of veto power and to give dissenters the right to exit the corporation
and recover the cash value of their shares,” which is commonly referred to as
the liquidity rationale.30  Absent a veto right, a shareholder could, as illus-
trated by Professor Bayless Manning, own a horse and suddenly find that
22 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, § 9.42.
23 David J. Ratway, Delaware’s Stock Market Exception to Appraisal Rights: Dissenting Minor-
ity Stockholders of Warner Communications, Inc. are “Market-Out” of Luck, 28 U. TOL. L. REV.
179, 183 (1996).
24 Id.
25 4 COX & HAZEN, supra note 18.
26 Manning, supra note 2, at 246.
27 See Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.R. Co., 30 Pa. 42, 42 (1858) (holding that “[a single
stockholder] cannot be compelled by law to accept the stock of the other company in
payment for the shares held by him” unless the majority members “first giv[e] security for
the interest of such dissenting stockholder”).
28 Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate
Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 14 (1995) (noting that in 1909 only about half of states still required a
unanimous vote to approve a merger, but it was not until the 1920s and 1930s that the
appraisal remedy spread throughout the United States).  Today, all fifty states have an
appraisal remedy.  Albert Choi & Eric Talley, Appraising the “Merger Price” Appraisal Rule 2
(Va. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 2017-01, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2888420.
29 See In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173, 2015 WL 66825, at *3 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 5, 2015).
30 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, § 9.42.
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after the merger, he owned a cow instead.31  The perceived injustice of this
reality was informed by an early suspicion and distaste for corporate combi-
nations in general, strengthening the need for some sort of remedy to let the
shareholder out of the transaction in the absence of veto power.32  Thus, to
compensate shareholders for this perceived injustice and to provide liquidity,
appraisal offered shareholders a choice: accept the deal—a cow for a horse—
or dissent and seek appraisal.33
B. The Modern Justifications of Appraisal
The liquidity rationale, although still at play today, is largely secondary
in significance to a more pressing concern: the need to protect minority
shareholders from majority abuse, especially in transactions involving a per-
ceived conflict of interest or the potential for self-dealing.34  Appraisal peti-
tions today tend to be used to dissent from transactions with “lower deal
premia,” as well as going-private transactions, which are precisely the ones
most likely to take advantage of minority shareholders.35
A classic example of the type of merger in which concern for minority
shareholders abounds (and one of the types of mergers granted appraisal
rights in Delaware’s appraisal statute),36 is the short-form merger.  A short-
form merger occurs “when a subsidiary merges into a parent that already
owns most of the subsidiary’s shares,”37 usually around ninety percent.38  In
such a scenario, there is a risk that the parent company will offer the subsidi-
ary’s shareholders a price for their shares that is less than fair value, because
the transaction does not require a shareholder vote39 (meaning there is less
incentive to pay a competitive price).  However, in such a scenario, the availa-
bility of the appraisal remedy serves as an ex ante threat to those companies
31 Manning, supra note 2, at 246.
32 See id.
33 Helen M. Richards, Comment, Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.: A Whole New Ball
Game for Dissenting Shareholders, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 999, 1002–03 (1989).
34 4 COX & HAZEN, supra note 18; Ernest L. Folk III, De Facto Mergers in Delaware: Hari-
ton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 49 VA. L. REV. 1261, 1293 (1963); Thompson, supra note 28,
at 4.
35 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 2, at 1555.  The authors measure merger premiums by
computing an expected merger premium based on key variables such as the year of the
merger, the size of the corporation, and the industry.  They then use the difference
between the expected and the actual premium to approximate the merits of the stockhold-
ers’ claim. Id. at 1593–94.  Negative deal premium indicates that petitioners are targeting
deals with merit (i.e., the merger price is less than what it likely should have been). Id. at
1594–95.
36 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(3) (2016); 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8,
§ 9.43[A].
37 Merger, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
38 See Short-form Merger, Practical Law Glossary Item 0-382-3820 (West 2017).
39 See id.
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who would consider offering a low price,40 and an ex post remedy for share-
holders who feel they have not received a fair one.41  Thus, appraisal can
serve as a defense against “sloth, negligence, or unconscious bias in the sales
process.”42
Admittedly, fiduciary duty litigation is also meant in part to protect
minority shareholders, albeit against particular directors personally rather
than the company as a whole.43  However, the appraisal remedy in recent
years has been used more frequently to further this shared objective.44
Although some scholars believe that the appraisal remedy unnecessarily
duplicates fiduciary duty cases—specifically, management breaches of the
duty of loyalty—others theorize that the remedy is a welcome complement to
the fiduciary duty alternative.45  Professors Hideki Kanda and Saul Levmore
argue that appraisal is valuable notwithstanding the fiduciary duty alternative
because it “does not require an allegation of managerial misconduct.”46
Indeed, appraisal is a fundamentally different inquiry from that of a fiduciary
duty case: it is only concerned with whether the shareholders received a fair
price for their shares.47  The price could certainly be unfair because of a
breach of fiduciary duty, but even without a breach, the court may—and
often does—find that the fair price is higher than what was offered to the
shareholders.48  To put it another way, the “conclusion that a sale was con-
40 See Folk, supra note 34, at 1293 (describing appraisal rights as a “shield of protec-
tion” against insiders).
41 See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 86 (noting that appraisal has value because it
“serve[s] as a well-designed emergency switch to check management improvidence”); Jiang
et al., supra note 4, at 698 (noting that appraisal can be used to “fight[ ] managerial agency
costs that can lead to certain forms of mergers”).
42 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 2, at 1555.
43 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 321–22.
44 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322, 2015 WL 4313206, at *23 n.22 (Del.
Ch. July 13, 2015) (noting that “[s]trong arguments can be made that appraisal represents
a more rational and efficient alternative to traditional fiduciary duty litigation”); Thomp-
son, supra note 28, at 4 (“In earlier times, policing transactions in which those who con-
trolled the corporation had a conflict of interest was left to the courts through the use of
fiduciary duty or statutes that limited corporate powers.  Today, that function is left for
appraisal in many cases.”).
45 Paul G. Mahoney & Mark Weinstein, The Appraisal Remedy and Merger Premiums, 1
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 239, 251 (1999). But see Norwitz, supra note 12, at 2–3.
46 Mahoney & Weinstein, supra note 45, at 251 (citing Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore,
The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L. REV. 429 (1985)).
47 See, e.g., Huff Fund Inv. P’ship v. CKx, Inc., No. 6844, 2013 WL 5878807, at *13
(Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013) (“[T]he issue in this case is fair value, not fiduciary duty.”).
48 In this, the court is careful not to conflate fiduciary duty obligations with appraisal
rights, since the two are “conceptually and doctrinally distinct.”  Brief of Law, Economics
and Corporate Finance Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners-Appellees and
Affirmance at 6, DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., No. 2016-548-13, 2017
WL 589458 (Del. Feb. 9, 2017) [hereinafter Brief of Law].
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ducted by directors who complied with their duties of loyalty is not dispositive
of the question of whether that sale generated fair value.”49
C. Procedural Requirements
Although determining fair value can be difficult, as we will later see,
understanding when and how appraisal becomes available is a different chal-
lenge entirely.  Delaware’s appraisal statute triggers an absolute right to
appraisal for only certain types of mergers, such as mergers involving cash
consideration, short-form mergers, and interested transactions.50  Addition-
ally, corporations may specify other enumerated situations that will trigger
appraisal rights in their charters.51  Yet, as original critics of the statute were
quick to note, burdensome procedural requirements generally make it diffi-
cult to pursue appraisal claims, even if available in a plethora of circum-
stances.52  Moreover, the Delaware courts require technical compliance with
the statute, leaving little room for any equitable considerations.53  Add in the
fact that any shareholder electing to appraise his or her shares does not
receive any consideration until the resolution of the appraisal54—which
could be several years away—and one can begin to understand why appraisal
had a reputation for being a “remedy of desperation” for much of its his-
tory.55  Despite these difficulties, however, petitioners continue to bring their
claims in accordance with the statute’s requirements, as detailed below.
First, at least twenty days prior to a meeting in which the shareholders
will be voting for or against the merger or consolidation, the company must
inform all stockholders entitled to appraisal rights56 of the upcoming vote.57
At that time, the company must also provide shareholders with the necessary
material facts that will allow them to determine whether to accept the merger
49 In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173, 2015 WL 399726, at *16 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 30, 2015).
50 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, § 9.43[A].
51 Id.
52 ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 12.2, at 508 (1986) (“[A]ppraisal is often
a cumbersome remedy.”); PETER V. LETSOU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS 429 (2006) (referring to the appraisal statute as a “complicated maze”);
Korsmo & Myers, supra note 2, at 1561 (characterizing the appraisal process as a “suppos-
edly Byzantine procedure”).
53 See Berger v. Pubco Corp., 976 A.2d 132, 144 (Del. 2009) (“Our case law is replete
with examples where dissenting minority shareholders that failed to comply strictly with
certain technical requirements of the appraisal statute, were held to have lost their entitle-
ment to an appraisal . . . .”).
54 See Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530, 547–48 (Del. Ch. 2000).  Shareholders also
lose other benefits of ownership, such as the right to vote or the right to receive dividends.
1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, § 9.44[J].
55 Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 85.
56 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, § 9.44[A].  Those entitled to appraisal rights
must be stockholders of record (i.e., they must own the stock of the company on whatever
day the company determines its stockholders for notice purposes). Id. § 9.43[B].
57 Id. § 9.44[A].
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consideration or to instead seek appraisal.58  These material facts comprise
detailed information about premerger financials, the proper procedure for
seeking out a judicial appraisal of shares, and a copy of the appraisal statute
itself, which is strictly required.59
Any shareholder wishing to pursue appraisal must then submit a written
demand to the corporation prior to the merger vote.60  Simply voting against
the merger does not preserve one’s appraisal rights; a stockholder, largely for
notice reasons, must submit the written demand ex ante.61  This is important
because it allows the corporation to get some sense of the risk, in dollar
terms, of going forward with a merger.62  Finally, at the vote itself, the share-
holder may not vote in favor or consent to a vote in favor of the merger.63
Should this occur, appraisal rights are strictly forfeited.64
After the vote, the corporation must, within ten days, notify each stock-
holder—who provided a written demand for appraisal, and did not vote in
favor of the merger—of the effective date of the merger.65  Only stockhold-
ers who held their shares continually from the date of their written demand
through the effective date of the merger will preserve their appraisal rights,66
in large part because the statute is designed to prevent any opportunistic
behavior in this regard.67  At this time, stockholders are also entitled to
receive a statement documenting the aggregate number of shares for which
appraisal was demanded, as this information can be useful in determining
whether or not to proceed with appraisal.68
58 Id. § 9.44[B].  “Materiality” is determined using the same standards as in other con-
texts.  Id.
59 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)(1) (2016); 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8,
§ 9.44[A].
60 tit. 8, § 262(d)(1).
61 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, § 9.44[C].
62 See Ala. By-Prods. Corp. v. Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254, 263 (Del. 1995) (“This infor-
mation allows the corporation to allocate the funds necessary to pay the dissenting share-
holders the fair value of their stock.” (citing Salt Dome Oil Corp. v. Schenck, 41 A.2d 583,
589 (Del. 1945))).  If a corporation senses that many of its shareholders will dissent, it may
call off the vote altogether or actually increase the deal price to try and prevent arbi-
trageurs from following through with their threatened claims. See Baca, supra note 10, at
443.
63 tit. 8, § 262(a); 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, § 9.43[B].
64 tit. 8 § 262(a); Richards, supra note 33, at 1005.
65 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, § 9.44[D].  This is assuming the merger
receives enough shareholder votes to be approved; if not, there will be no effective date
because there will be no merger.
66 tit. 8, § 262(a); Abraham & Co. v. Olivetti Underwood Corp., 204 A.2d 740, 742–43
(Del. Ch. 1964).
67 See 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, § 9.43[B] (“This requirement is intended
to deny appraisal rights to a party who was a stockholder of record when the demand was
made, then sold shares only to reacquire other shares so as to become a stockholder of
record on the effective date.”).
68 Id. § 9.44[E].
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Dissenting shareholders who still wish to seek appraisal then have 120
days after the effective merger date to file an appraisal petition with the
court.69  A single filing by a dissenting shareholder preserves the remedy for
all of the shareholders eligible for appraisal, although each petitioner will
have to proceed individually, as there are no class action or collective action
procedures in the appraisal context.70  Alternatively, shareholders may
decide to negotiate a settlement rather than endure protracted litigation to
determine the fair value of their shares.71  Professors Charles Korsmo and
Minor Myers postulate that in the appraisal context, the strongest claims are
the ones most likely to settle, although conclusive data remains admittedly
limited.72
After jumping through each of these procedural hoops—which are nec-
essary simply to preserve the remedy and do not in any way prove or validate
a claim—the court may additionally require a hearing to establish which
stockholders have met all of the procedural requirements and are thus enti-
tled to appraisal.73  In that hearing, each stockholder bears the burden of
proof of having achieved perfect compliance with the statute,74 as the corpo-
ration itself has no responsibility to determine stockholders’ eligibility for the
remedy.75  If a shareholder successfully makes it through all of the highly
technical requirements above, he or she can finally proceed with the claim.
Yet the hard work is far from over: appraisal petitions going through the
judicial process take an average of two to three years to resolve.76  During this
time, shareholders must fund the litigation out of pocket, as they receive no
consideration for their shares until a judicial resolution determines whether
they were offered a fair price for their shares or are justified in receiving a
different one.77
69 Id. § 9.44[F].
70 Id. One caveat to this statement: quasi-appraisal is available as an equitable remedy
for disclosure violations and allows the stockholders to proceed with an appraisal claim as
an opt-out class.  Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 337.
71 According to Korsmo and Myers, “[p]ractioners have reported . . . that as many as
one in four appraisal demands settles without a public filing.”  Korsmo & Myers, supra note
3, at 292.  However, settlements may be more difficult to achieve than in the fiduciary duty
context, largely because appraisers lack a class structure that can use “collective leverage”
to reach a settlement with the relevant parties.  Onyeador, supra note 11, at 346.
72 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 292–93.  More recent research indicates that more
than eighty percent of appraisal cases settle before trial.  Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 699.
73 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, § 9.44[H].  The corporation can expressly or
impliedly waive its right to this hearing. Id.
74 Id.
75 See Dirienzo v. Steel Partners Holdings L.P., No. 4506, 2009 WL 4652944, at *7 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 8, 2009) (“[N]othing in Section 262 requires a company to notify dissenting
stockholders prior to the filing of an appraisal petition that they failed to comply with
Section 262.  The court determines those who are entitled to appraisal after an appraisal
petition has been filed.”).
76 Gaurav Jetley & Xinyu Ji, Appraisal Arbitrage—Is There a Delaware Advantage?, 71 BUS.
LAW. 427, 452 n.86 (2016).
77 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h), (i) (2016).
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II. THE RISE OF APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE: NEW DEVELOPMENTS
But there is a different species of professional shareholder-at-large whose mind and
method run somewhat differently.  He, or his counsel, sees in the appraisal statutes a
jimmy that will open windows. . . . He can abuse the procedural process under the
appraisal statute to the cost and disruption of the enterprise.
Bayless Manning, 196278
Despite a strong normative belief in the necessity of the appraisal rem-
edy given shareholders’ loss of veto power, appraisal was viewed for most of
its history as unhelpful and practically useless.79  Referred to as a “last-ditch
check on management improvidence,”80 scholarly criticisms largely stemmed
from the understanding that sophisticated parties could simply structure
transactions to avoid triggering appraisal rights.81  Others dismissed the rem-
edy outright because of its onerous procedural requirements, as outlined
above.82
Notwithstanding these requirements, however, the twenty-first century
has seen an increase in appraisal proceedings, most of which fall under what
has been termed “appraisal arbitrage.”83  Between 2004 and 2010, for exam-
ple, only five percent of appraisal-eligible transactions led to an appraisal
petition, but by 2013 more than fifteen percent of eligible transactions
attracted appraisal.84  This increase in appraisal occurred despite no corre-
sponding increase in merger activity.85  Moreover, not only were repeat play-
ers such as investment firms and hedge funds the ones bringing these
petitions,86 but the amount of money at stake had also significantly
increased.87
78 Manning, supra note 2, at 238.
79 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 2, at 1560.
80 Id. (quoting Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers
and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 304 (1974)).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1560–61; see also supra Section I.C.
83 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 2, at 1573–74.
84 Claudia H. Allen et al., Proceedings of the 2016 Delaware Business Law Forum: A Review
and Debate of the Public Policy Implications of Delaware Law, 72 BUS. LAW. 755, 759–60 (2017)
(citing Korsmo & Myers, supra note 2, at 1570).  Of these petitions, an unusually high rate,
around fifteen percent, end up resulting in a trial.  Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 286.
85 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 2, at 1571–72.
86 Id. at 1572 (“Since 2011, more than eighty percent of appraisal proceedings have
involved a repeat petitioner . . . .”); see also Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 706 (“Merion
Capital, Magnetar Capital, Merlin Partners, Ancora, and Quadre Investments are the main
players.  Together they file[d] petitions in 61 deals, or about 27.1 percent of all the deals
challenged between 2000 and 2014.”).
87 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 2, at 1553 (“The value of claims in appraisal in 2013
was nearly $1.5 billion, a tenfold increase from 2004 . . . .”).  This value is “more than five
times the highest value of dissenting shares in the five years prior.”  Craig Boyd, Comment,
Appraisal Arbitrage: Closing the Floodgates on Hedge Funds and Activist Shareholders, 65 U. KAN.
L. REV. 497, 503 (2016).
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Although there is not a firm consensus within the scholarly community
about why appraisal arbitrage occurs, there are three chief reasons cited for
its rise, each of which will be discussed in turn below.  This Part then briefly
overviews the 2016 amendments to the Delaware appraisal statute—which
were put in place to address some of these concerns—and also identifies a
recent trend in the Delaware Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that casts light
on the appraisal remedy’s future and grounds the suggestions made in Part
III.
A. Record Date and the Opportunistic Investor
Delaware’s appraisal statute allows only those who are holders of record
and who did not vote their shares in favor of the merger to seek appraisal.88
Yet in In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.,89 the court held that those
seeking appraisal do not need to prove that their specific shares were not
voted in favor of the merger.90  This is in large part because shares are often
held by stockholders—holders of record—on behalf of multiple beneficial
owners.91  These stocks are held in large depositories and registered in name
to the holder of record, and beneficial owners own a pro rata share of these
stocks rather than specific shares or blocks of shares.92  Thus, it would be
impossible and, indeed, a judicial fiction, to decide which specific shares a
beneficial owner owned and told the holder of record not to vote in favor of
the merger.93  It is sufficient to show that enough shares were not voted in
favor of the merger such that it is mathematically possible that the beneficial
owner’s shares were not voted in favor of it.94
The judge in Transkaryotic noted that the decision he reached might
“encourage appraisal litigation initiated by arbitrageurs who buy into
appraisal suits,” but noted that this was for the legislature rather than the
courts to manage.95  Subsequent articles have frequently pointed to this deci-
sion as one of the major driving forces behind appraisal arbitrage,96 because
arbitrageurs can acquire stock after the announcement of a merger and still
pursue appraisal.97  Indeed, the Transkaryotic decision is significant because it
88 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2016).
89 No. 1554, 2007 WL 1378345 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007).
90 Id. at *3.
91 Id. at *2.
92 Id.
93 See id.
94 Id. at *4; Norwitz, supra note 12, at 3.
95 Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 2007 WL 1378345, at *5.
96 See, e.g., Kesten, supra note 6, at 102–05; Baca, supra note 10, at 434–37; Boyd, supra
note 87, at 503–05; Onyeador, supra note 11, at 363–66. But see Richard A. Booth, The Real
Problem with Appraisal Arbitrage, 72 BUS. LAW. 325, 327–30 (2017); Korsmo & Myers, supra
note 2, at 1553–54.
97 See, e.g., Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., No. 8900, 2015 WL 67586, at *1
(Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015) (noting that the merger was announced in May, and the appraisal
arbitrageurs began purchasing their shares in July; this was after determining to “invest” in
appraisal because the target in the acquisition appeared to be undervalued).
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allows shareholders to purchase shares up until the date of the shareholder
vote, giving appraisal arbitrageurs ample time to peruse the company-pro-
vided information about the upcoming merger to determine whether to buy-
in or not.98  Opponents of appraisal arbitrage say this offers arbitrageurs an
unfair advantage—essentially a free call option99—and that it contravenes
the purpose of the appraisal statute.100
There are others, however, who suggest that allowing appraisal arbi-
trageurs to essentially buy into a case is advantageous.101  It allows petitioners
to not only signal serious intent by buying in, but by thoroughly reviewing the
case before deciding to proceed with it, petitioners can generally ensure that
more cases are brought on their merits.102  Rather than simply contesting
any deal above a certain dollar amount, as we see happening in the fiduciary
duty class action context, arbitrageurs can bring a claim in which they actu-
ally suspect there is a difference between what was offered for the shares and
the fair value of what they are worth.103
B. Interest Rate Advantage
Another oft-cited reason for the recent uptick in appraisal arbitrage is
the statutory interest rate associated with the appraisal statute.104  In 2007,
the Delaware legislature changed the interest rate on appraisal claims to five
percent above the federal funds rate, compounded quarterly.105  This gener-
ous rate arguably encourages appraisal arbitrageurs to bring suit because
even if their shares do not receive a large premium over the merger price at
trial, they still accrue interest throughout the litigation, which usually takes
98 See Kesten, supra note 6, at 102.  But see Booth, supra note 96, at 328 (arguing that
“[i]t  is almost impossible for any information revealed after a merger is announced to
affect fair price as determined by an appraisal court”).
99 Jetley & Ji, supra note 76, at 430.  There is an average of ninety-one days between the
announcement of a merger and the shareholder meeting in which arbitrageurs would
need to vote against the merger. Id. at 436 fig.1.
100 See Theodore Mirvis, Delaware Court Decisions on Appraisal Rights Highlight Need for
Reform, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 21, 2015), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/01/21/delaware-court-decisions-on-appraisal-rights-high-
light-need-for-reform/.
101 See, e.g., Baca, supra note 10, at 445.
102 See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do
the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 836 (2014).
103 An estimated ninety percent of all mergers are challenged by fiduciary duty litiga-
tion, with the percentage being even higher in mergers of over 100 million dollars.  Kor-
smo & Myers, supra note 2, at 1581.  For broader litigation trends in corporate business
transactions, see Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2012 (Feb. 1,
2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2216727.
104 See, e.g., Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 700.
105 76 Del. Laws 145 (2007); Korsmo & Myers, supra note 2, at 1580.  The Delaware
courts have power, in equity, to apply a different interest rate if there has been bad faith or
improper delay on the part of the petitioning party. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h)
(2016); In re Appraisal of Metromedia Int’l Grp., Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 907 (Del. Ch. 2009).
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two to three years.106  This so-called interest rate advantage explains in part
why Merion Capital, an appraisal arbitrageur, was reportedly allocated one
billion dollars to pursue appraisal related claims as an investment strategy in
2013,107 and observed in its promotional materials that the “‘typical’ worst
case scenario [in an appraisal petition] is the deal price plus statutory inter-
est.”108  Although some scholars argue that the interest rate that petitioners
receive in appraisal actions is not actually that attractive when you compare it
to the stock market and other comparable investments,109 others neverthe-
less see the interest rate as a driver of appraisal activity.110  As such, this issue
was expressly addressed in the 2016 amendments, which will be discussed
shortly.
C. Judicial Valuation of Shares
Finally, the true goal of appraisal arbitrage is to receive a judicially deter-
mined fair value for one’s shares above and beyond the merger price per
share.111  Without that possibility, it is unlikely that any information advan-
tage or attractive interest rate alone will incentivize appraisal.  This is in large
part because appraisal arbitrageurs seek a value for their shares which is
above the going concern value, and receive a low or potentially even negative
return when the court’s valuation is merely the merger price.112  Accord-
ingly, the most pervasive, powerful, and consistent criticism of appraisal is
simply that courts are ill suited to return accurate valuations of “fair value,”
which is what is required of courts under Delaware’s appraisal statute.113  Not
just academics but the justices themselves have repeatedly noted the difficulty
of this task.114
106 Jetley & Ji, supra note 76, at 452 n.86.
107 Miles Weiss, Dell Value Dispute Spotlights Rise in Appraisal Arbitrage, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
3, 2013), http://www.shareholderforum.com/dell/Library/20131003_Bloomberg.htm.
108 Mirvis, supra note 100.
109 See, e.g., Booth, supra note 96, at 339–40; Jetley & Ji, supra note 76, at 431; Korsmo &
Myers, supra note 2, at 1580.
110 See Jetley & Ji, supra note 76, at 431.
111 Yet getting fair value for your shares can be a “casino-like” process.  James C.
Morphy, Doing Away with Appraisal in Public Deals, 26 DEL. LAW. 30 (2008); see also Michael
P. Dooley, Rules, Standards, and the Model Business Corporation Act, 74 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 45, 53 (2011) (noting that appraisal is “something of a lottery”).
112 See Baca, supra note 10, at 440 (“The newest research actually shows that not only is
the merger price valuation the strategic equivalent of nullifying appraisal rights altogether,
but that it can even undercompensate dissenting shareholders.”).
113 See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 2, at 1602; Norwitz, supra note 12, at 3, 6 (noting
that “[a]ppraisal rights themselves are not the problem,” and that the fight in appraisal
litigation “centers on valuation metrics”).
114 See Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. GT LP, 11 A.3d 214, 217 (Del. 2010) (noting that
determining fair value is an “imperfect process”); In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No.
8173, 2015 WL 399726, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (“I have commented elsewhere on
the difficulties, if not outright incongruities, of a law-trained judge determining fair value
of a company in light of an auction sale, aided by experts offering wildly different opinions
on value.”); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 359
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For a long time, the Delaware courts exclusively used the Delaware Block
Method to determine the fair value of shares.115  Yet the courts eventually
disclaimed this as unduly structured and inflexible,116 and shifted toward
other methods, including comparable company analysis, Discounted Cash
Flow modeling, and the merger price itself.
In a comparable company analysis, the court examines companies of
similar size and type, comes up with a valuation multiple, adjusts the multiple
to the company at hand, and then uses the multiple to value the revenue
streams of the company being appraised.117  From this, the court gets an
estimate of fair value.  Yet this method is subject to various limitations, such
as the similarities between the companies, and becomes ultimately worthless
if the companies are significantly different.118  As such, the more favored
model and the one more frequently utilized is the Discounted Cash Flow
(DCF) model.119
The three components of a DCF analysis are the cash flow projections of
the company (at the point just before the merger transaction), the terminal
value, and the discount rate.120  The terminal value is an estimate of the pre-
sent value of the company’s future cash flows after a certain projection
period and then into perpetuity, while the discount rate is based on the cost
of the company’s weighted average cost of capital for both debt and
equity.121 The DCF model is used to value the corporation as a going con-
cern in today’s dollars, and is generally preferred by the financial community
because it can be used to value almost any company, not just a publicly
traded one.122  Moreover, unlike the comparable company analysis—the
accuracy of which relies on similarities such as industry, geographical loca-
tion, business model, and strategy—the DCF model can be used to calculate
the value of any company given its existing realities.123
(Del. Ch. 2004) (noting that the valuation process “involves an exercise in hubris and, at
best, reasoned guess-work”).
115 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, § 9.45[B][8]. The Delaware Block Method
was a “combination of three generally accepted methods for valuation: the asset approach,
the market approach, and the earnings approach.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting In re Radiology Assocs., Inc., 611 A.2d 485, 496 (Del. Ch. 1991)).  The court
calculated a company’s value based on each of these methods, assigned a percentage
weight subject to certain limitations, and arrived at the judicially determined fair value of
the corporation, which could then be broken into a “per share” value for each stockholder.
Id.
116 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (rejecting the “very
structured and mechanistic [valuation] procedure that has heretofore governed such
matters”).
117 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, § 9.45[B][2].
118 See id.
119 Id. § 9.45[B][1].
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 See Ratway, supra note 23, at 202–03.
123 See id. at 203.
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The shift away from the Delaware Block Method and to these alternative
models has shaken up the court system.  Whereas before there was some cer-
tainty, albeit imperfection, in the appraisal method, today the courts can rely
on any combination of possible analyses to determine “fair value,” so long as
the methods utilized are generally accepted in the financial community.124
This is a messy process for which judges are not inherently well suited, lead-
ing to inconsistencies in rulings and occasionally some outrageous premi-
ums.125  Such judgments raise concerns as to the suitability, consistency, and
ability of courts to determine fair value.
D. Delaware’s 2016 Amendments
Although the legislature’s 2016 amendments to the Delaware Appraisal
Statute126 did not seek to address the valuation issues just discussed, they did
seek to lessen appraisal arbitrage by focusing on the statutory interest rate as
well as who can bring an appraisal claim.
Model Business Corporation Act jurisdictions have long required compa-
nies to pay their shareholders the estimated fair value of their shares before
appraisal litigation starts.127  Delaware, on the other hand, wrote its appraisal
statute in such a way that corporations provide shareholders no considera-
tion for their shares until the end of litigation.128  The downside of this is
that interest accrues on those shares throughout litigation,129 which can take
several years.130  To combat appraisal arbitrageurs, who might seek litigation
in part for this interest rate accrual,131 one of the 2016 amendments now
allows corporations to pay cash upfront to dissenting shareholders at any
point during an appraisal petition.132  This largely addresses the concern
that the interest rate in appraisal was incentivizing unworthy appraisal
actions.133
The second amendment the legislature added is an exception for de
minimis appraisal claims, which are classified as those in which the collective
number of shares seeking appraisal is less than one percent of the shares
124 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712–13 (Del. 1983).
125 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322, 2016 WL 3186538 (Del. Ch. May 31,
2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master
Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017) (the Chancery Court offered appraisal arbitrageurs a
twenty-eight percent premium over the merger price).
126 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2016).
127 Baca, supra note 10, at 454.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Jetley & Ji, supra note 76, at 452 n.86.
131 Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 700 (“We also find a positive relation between the rate of
prejudgment interest accrual and the filing of appraisal petitions.”).
132 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2016).  At the end of the litigation, the corporation
would need to pay interest on any difference between the amount of cash they paid out
and the fair value of the shares as determined by the court. Id.
133 Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 700 (“Therefore, the [interest rate] amendment is likely
to significantly reduce the motive for seeking appraisal.”).
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outstanding and the consideration provided for the shares is less than one
million dollars.134  This amendment is expected to slow the amount of
appraisal petitions filed because appraisal arbitrageurs can no longer bring a
claim with just a few shares.135  Indeed, some experts postulate that given
historical filing rates in Delaware, this portion of the amendment could lead
to a twenty-five percent reduction in appraisal cases.136  As it costs corpora-
tions the same amount to litigate an appraisal claim regardless of how many
shares are at stake,137 this amendment serves as a protection against what
many view as “nuisance litigation.”138  Moreover, this de minimis exception is
key because there is no procedural way to limit appraisal petitions to only
those with merit: there are no motions to dismiss in the appraisal context.139
This amendment, of course, does not ensure merit, but it at least limits
appraisals to situations in which petitioners have a fairly significant financial
stake in the game.140
E. Jurisprudential Trends in Appraisal
Although in no way does this Note attempt to identify all of the recent
trends in Delaware appraisal litigation, there is at least one significant trend
worth mentioning: a greater deference to merger price in certain appraisal
transactions.  Beginning as early as 2010, some have argued that in cases
involving an arm’s-length transaction and a fair auction, the court should
presumptively defer to the merger price as the best evidence of fair value.141
However, as the court first made clear in Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT
LP,142 and again most recently in DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners,
L.P.,143 the appraisal statute’s requirement to determine fair value by taking
into account “all relevant factors”144 means there is no statutory presumption
134 tit. 8, § 262(g) (2016).
135 Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 708–09.  But note that “short-form mergers are not
subject to the de minimis exception.” Id. at 708.
136 Id. at 700.
[A]bout 32 percent of the cases involve stakes that are both below $1 million in
value and constitute less than 1 percent of the stock of the company.  Taking into
account that certain forms of mergers are not subject to the limit, we estimate
that the size threshold for a de minimis exception would have been binding on
about one-quarter of the cases.
Id.
137 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 102, at 880.
138 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 2, at 1600.
139 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 334.
140 See Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 708–09; Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 334 (ques-
tioning whether there was even a big enough problem to necessitate this amendment).
141 See, e.g., Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. GT LP, 11 A.3d 214, 217–18 (Del. 2010).
142 Id.
143 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017).
144 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2016).
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in favor of the merger price as the best evidence of fair value.145  That being
said, the Delaware courts have more recently begun to defer to the merger
price in auction situations where there was arm’s-length dealing and ade-
quate publicly available information.146
In Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd.,147 one of
Delaware’s most recent appraisal decisions, the court again acted in accor-
dance with this trend, chastising the Chancery Court for disregarding the
merger price altogether and using its own DCF model to value the shares
instead.148  Although the court recognized that the process of determining
fair value is a difficult one, it noted that the lower court’s conclusions did not
“follow logically from th[e] facts,” and were not grounded in “relevant,
accepted financial principles.”149  More significantly, however, the court
expressly articulated a sentiment that is central to the future of appraisal as a
remedy: “ ‘[F]air value’ does not equal ‘best value.’”150
III. PROTECTING THE EMERGENCY SWITCH
This Part proceeds in two Sections.  First, defending appraisal arbitrage
based on its more emergent deterrence purpose and accordingly, urging the
legislature to avoid adopting a revised ownership requirement.  And second,
arguing that although the contemporary trend toward using merger price as
the best evidence of fair value should stem the tide of appraisal arbitrage,
there is valid concern that such a trend will bleed over into other transactions
outside of the fair auction setting that it has come to typify.  To the extent
this concern stems from the unreliability of the other valuation approaches,
the courts should look to improve dependability, particularly in the use of
DCF models, through appointing a neutral, independent expert to arbitrate
DCF disagreements.
145 See, e.g., DFC Global Corp., 172 A.3d at 348 (noting that although the respondent
argued in favor of establishing “a presumption that in certain cases involving arm’s-length
mergers, the price of the transaction giving rise to appraisal rights is the best estimate of
fair value,” the court would not “engage in that act of creation, which in our view has no
basis in the statutory text”); Golden Telecom, Inc., 11 A.3d at 218 (“Requiring the Court of
Chancery to defer—conclusively or presumptively—to the merger price, even in the face
of a pristine, unchallenged transactional process, would contravene the unambiguous lan-
guage of the statute . . . .”).
146 DFC Global Corp., 172 A.3d at 349 (“[E]conomic principles suggest that the best
evidence of fair value was the deal price, as it resulted from an open process, informed by
robust public information.”); In re Appraisal of PetSmart, Inc., No. 10782, 2017 WL
2303599, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017) (“I am satisfied that the deal price of $83 per share,
‘forged in the crucible of objective market reality,’ is the best indicator of the fair value of
PetSmart.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc., No. 7046, 1991
WL 29303, at *17 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 1991))).
147 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017).
148 Id. at 21–26.
149 Id. at 23, 44.
150 Id. at 23.
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A. Deterrence: The Case for Maintaining Procedural Requirements
Appraisal arbitrage may not actually be a problem when you look at the
data comparatively: only about fifteen percent of appraisal eligible proceed-
ings result in a petition, which is significantly lower than the estimated ninety
percent of mergers that are challenged by a fiduciary duty class action law-
suit.151  Indeed, scholars note that if courts consistently overvalued compa-
nies in appraisal litigation, we would expect to see appraisal petitions filed in
nearly every eligible merger, regardless of their merits, much as is the case in
fiduciary duty litigation.152  Yet the research shows the opposite: appraisal
litigation is heavily associated with going private transactions, transactions
with low deal premia, and transactions with “perceived conflicts of inter-
est”153—all situations more likely to take advantage of minority sharehold-
ers.154  Thus, appraisal arbitrage is arguably doing what it should be:
protecting minority shareholders.  These findings support the contention
that appraisal “can serve as a back-end check on abuses by corporate manag-
ers, controlling shareholders, or other insiders in merger transactions.”155
Yet the common sentiment that more appraisal claims are being brought
for arbitrage purposes is not without merit.  From 1977 to 1997, only an aver-
age of fourteen appraisal claims were brought each year in Delaware,156
while today the average is closer to twenty-two.157  This sharp increase in the
number of appraisals filed is what inspired the interest rate and de minimis
amendments in 2016.  And although these amendments, in conjunction with
a greater reliance on merger price, should stem the appraisal arbitrage flow,
it remains a possibility that the Delaware legislature will in the future seek
further procedural limits on appraisal.  The most likely limit would be one
relating to the record owning requirement, which this Note argues against.
Several scholars have proposed overturning the Transkaryotic case158 or
otherwise amending the Delaware appraisal statute in order to strip benefi-
cial owners of appraisal rights if they did not own stock of the company on
the record date.159  The record date is used for voting purposes, which
means that under the current regime, an owner might not have voted in the
151 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 2, at 1581.
152 Id. at 1603.  The authors found that the bulk of fiduciary duty cases targeted trans-
actions with “no statistically significant regard for the merger price.”  Korsmo & Myers,
supra note 3, at 287.  Additionally, they found that fiduciary duty litigation is associated
with the deal size, but no other significant factors, indicating that these suits are brought
without regard for merit.  Korsmo & Myers, supra note 102, at 836.
153 Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 699.
154 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
155 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 2, at 1598.  Additionally, the authors note that “[w]hile
these results do not prove that appraisal arbitrage is a positive development, it does at least
suggest that appraisal is not simply a new frontier of nuisance litigation.” Id. at 1597.
156 Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 701.
157 Baca, supra note 10, at 429.
158 In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. 1554, 2007 WL 1378345 (Del.
Ch. May 2, 2007).
159 See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 339; Norwitz, supra note 12, at 3, 6.
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merger, but can still contest the fair value of their shares.160  This might
seem fundamentally wrong.  Yet getting rid of the large players (who are the
ones who can afford to bring suit,161 yet are also often the owners com-
plained of above) through a change in appraisal ownership requirements
would likely mean the remedy regains its formerly sleepy status.162  This
would be socially undesirable.
A recent study “analyz[ing] data on over 2,000 acquisitions of publicly
traded Delaware targets between January 2003 and December 2016 . . .
f[ound] that appraisal-eligible deals had higher average announcement
premia over appraisal-ineligible deals,”163 reaffirming the value of appraisal
for shareholders ex ante.164  Yet fundamentally, it remains difficult to bring
an appraisal claim, and changing procedural requirements to further limit
who can seek appraisal might make bringing a claim nearly impossible.
First, the procedural requirements are quite technical, and even a tiny
misstep could mean a forfeiture of appraisal rights.165  For example, in
Konfirst v. Willow CSN Inc.,166 the court found that shareholders who were
away on vacation when they received notice of their appraisal rights and thus
submitted their demand for appraisal a day late, had no recourse.167  In Raab
v. Villager Industries, Inc.,168 the court held that for jointly owned stock, it was
acceptable for only one party to sign the written demand for appraisal, but it
was not adequate for just one to sign the demand for payment.169  Technical-
ities such as these trip up individual shareholders, but are less likely to con-
fuse sophisticated parties, meaning more potentially meritorious suits can
reach trial with large shareholders at the helm.
Second, large shareholders can buy into appraisal cases and thus selec-
tively choose the ones with merit.  Although some are still opposed to the
idea of appraisal arbitrageurs buying their way in,170 this view is somewhat
160 Cf. Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 339.
161 4 COX & HAZEN, supra note 18, § 22:24 (noting that “seldom is appraisal sought by
investors whose holdings are less than $100,000”).
162 This is because deterrence only works if you have two factors: “capability,” which is
currently at risk, and “will.” See Jimmy Vielkind, At Conservative Party Conference, Harry Wil-
son Aims at Cuomo, Politico (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/
albany/story/2016/02/at-conservative-party-conference-harry-wilson-aims-at-cuomo-
030756 (quoting Chris Gibson, former U.S. Representative from New York).
163 Scott Callahan, Darius Palia & Eric Talley, Appraisal Arbitrage and Shareholder Value,
COLUM. L. SCH. BLOG ON CORP. & THE CAP. MKT. (Dec. 14, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law
.columbia.edu/2017/12/14/appraisal-arbitrage-and-shareholder-value/.
164 See Kanda & Levmore, supra note 46, at 436 (“Presumably, appraisal’s expense and
potential to drain liquid assets would encourage managers not to abandon shareholders
but, instead, to make plans that carried old shareholders on . . . .”).
165 Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 72.
166 No. 1737, 2006 WL 3803469 (Del. Ch. Dec. 14, 2006).
167 Id. at *1.
168 355 A.2d 888 (Del. 1976).
169 Id. at 891–92.
170 See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 314.
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antiquated: people buy and sell legal claims all the time.171  Moreover, buy-
ing into the suit, as appraisal arbitrageurs frequently do, may actually be
advantageous.  The arbitrageurs cannot only signal serious intent by buying
into a transaction, but by thoroughly reviewing the case before deciding to
proceed with it, they can ensure that more cases are brought on their mer-
its.172  As it remains expensive to litigate an appraisal claim regardless of the
number of shares owned,173 it makes more economical sense for the hedge
funds—who have more resources, wherewithal, and knowledge—to bring
suit.174  Hedge funds may also be able to more easily amass the shares neces-
sary to overcome the new de minimis exception, and thus represent a solu-
tion to the collective action problem that has arguably prevented more
appraisal petitions from being brought in the past.175
Additionally, although some still argue that appraisal arbitrageurs
should be kept out of the appraisal remedy altogether because their use of
the statute is not in alignment with its original purpose, this argument fails to
take into consideration that even non–appraisal arbitrageurs no longer use
the appraisal statute for liquidity purposes.176  In the 1960s, cash became an
acceptable form of consideration in mergers, and courts “interpreted the
new cash merger statutes to permit disparate treatment that forced out
minority shareholders.”177  Since minority shareholders were being forced
out rather than obligated to take stock they did not want, “appraisal served
no liquidity function”: the cash for their shares was the liquidity.178  Addi-
tionally, the liquidity justification lost ground with the eventual emergence of
a ready stock market in which shareholders could sell their publicly traded
shares.179  This is why many states, including Delaware, added a market out
exception to their appraisal rights statutes: if shareholders receive solely stock
in a transaction and can sell their shares on the market in order to exit the
171 Id. (noting that, in modern society, “[c]ontract claims are often freely assignable,”
claims related to property “can often be transferred with the property,” and many legal
claims such as corporate class action suits have rights that “typically transfer[ ] with the
shares”).
172 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 102, at 836.
173 Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407,
423 (2006) (“[S]hareholders seeking an appraisal . . . must pay the costs of providing the
remedy, making it attractive only in the most extreme cases.” (footnote omitted)).
174 See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 102, at 880; Randall S. Thomas, Revising the Delaware
Appraisal Statute, 3 DEL. L. REV. 1, 27 (2000).
175 Cf. Onyeador, supra note 11, at 346 (discussing how the procedural complexities of
appraisal generally make “the process of securing standing . . . expensive” (emphasis omit-
ted)).  To the extent hedge funds can secure standing more economically than the average
shareholder due to their more extensive resources (financial and otherwise), they can
accordingly bring more appraisal petitions.
176 See Thompson, supra note 28, at 21–22.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 22.
179 Id.
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company, there is no need for the court to appraise their shares and dupli-
cate what the market is already offering.180
Therefore, the more modern view of appraisal’s purpose, as a policing
mechanism against the opportunistic behavior of the majority, is more per-
suasive.  Yet in order for this policing or deterrence method to continue to
work, appraisal arbitrageurs must be able to bring appraisal claims.  Chang-
ing the record date or ownership requirements likely ends most remaining
appraisal arbitrage, but at the expense of protecting minority shareholders.
The legislature should think carefully in the future before proceeding with
such a change.
B. Merger Price Deference: Cause for Concern?
The trend in Delaware toward greater deference to the statutory merger
price in situations where there was a fair auction, arm’s-length dealing, and
adequate publicly available information, is a welcome development given fre-
quent concerns about the court’s appraisal methods.181  As many have noted,
one of the issues with appraisal valuation is that it can be highly subjective or
unreliable:182 the DCF model, which is largely favored by the courts,183 is
subject to a number of different inputs,184 and valuations can vary widely
between the opposing parties’ experts.185  The advantage of the merger price
is that, depending on the circumstances, it represents the best estimate of a
company’s value.186  Moreover, generally deferring to the merger price
going forward is expected to limit appraisal arbitrage.187
Choosing the merger price as the best indication of fair value functions a
bit like the business judgment rule from an analytical standpoint, which
180 See id.
181 See Daniel E. Meyer, Comment, Maybe Publius Was Right: Relying on Merger Price to
Determine Fair Value in Delaware Appraisal Cases, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 153, 174–76 (2016). See
generally Booth, supra note 96; Boyd, supra note 87.
182 See, e.g., Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 35
(Del. 2017) (referring to DCF models generally as “less-than-surefire”); LongPath Capital,
LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., No. 8094, 2015 WL 4540443, at *12–13 (Del. Ch. June 30,
2015).
183 See Jetley & Ji, supra note 76, at 442.
184 See supra Section II.C.
185 For example, the expert for the appraisal petitioners in DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield
Value Partners, L.P. calculated a valuation for the company using a DCF model which
resulted in a per share price that was eighty-eight percent above the merger price, while
the defense’s DCF model resulted in a value less than the merger price.  172 A.3d 346,
357–58 (Del. 2017).
186 See William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continu-
ing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 26–28.
187 See Paul Bork et al., Latest Amendments to Delaware Law Revise Appraisal Rights,
FOLEYHOAG LLP (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.foleyhoag.com/publications/alerts-and-up
dates/2016/august/latest-amendments-to-delaware-law-revise-appraisal-rights; Gail Wein-
stein et al., The Appraisal Landscape: Key Points, Open Issues, and Practice Points, HARV. L. SCH.
FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 23, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard
.edu/2018/01/23/the-appraisal-landscape-key-points-open-issues-and-practice-points/.
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presumes that a board of directors’ decisions were made in good faith, on an
informed basis, and with an honest and reasonable belief that the decision
was in the best interests of the company.188  Indeed, the court’s more explicit
recognition that “ ‘fair value’ does not equal ‘best value’”189 implies a range
of prices within which the court may determine a reasonably fair price lies.190
This range may or may not include the merger price, but in an auction set-
ting (absent issues with the transaction itself), it likely does.
Selecting the merger price as the best indicator of fair value in such an
auction setting is precisely what the courts should do.  An auction is the stan-
dard against which interested transactions are compared,191 and an auction
generally ensures that the company, and therefore the shareholders, gets the
best price possible: “[W]hat someone would be willing to pay.”192  Far from
adopting a blanket presumption of the merger price as the best evidence of
fair value in all transactions—or even in all transactions involving an auc-
tion—the Delaware courts appear willing and able to deeply examine a trans-
action and determine whether it resulted in a fair price or not.193  Although
some argue that this line of reasoning steers the court toward auction theory,
which is arguably more of a technical discipline than the valuation methodol-
ogies the court currently handles,194 there is no evidence as of yet to suggest
the court is not up to this task.  Moreover, in the past the court has skirted
auction technicalities,195 and it could likely do so going forward.
Yet opponents of this merger price “presumption,” even in an auction
setting, have valid concerns, chief of which is that such a presumption will
chill appraisal petitions.196  The argument goes as follows: in the process of
negotiating a merger and determining a selling price, the “credible threat of
appraisal plays a critical role in market design,” by helping, in an auction
setting, to set a “credible ‘reserve price.’”197
188 See Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971).
189 Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 23 (Del.
2017).
190 See Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 466–67 (Del. Ch. 2011).
191 See Huff Fund Inv. P’ship v. CKx, Inc., No. 6844, 2013 WL 5878807, at *11 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 1, 2013).
192 Baron v. Pressed Metals of Am., Inc., 123 A.2d 848, 854 (Del. 1956).
193 See, e.g., Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 46 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(refusing to rely on merger price because of “the lack of an open auction at the beginning
of the sale process”); LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., No. 8094, 2015 WL
4540443, at *24–25 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (relying on merger price even when only one
buyer made a firm offer, because there was a public sales process and unreliable DCF
projections).
194 See Eric L. Talley, Finance in the Courtroom: Appraising Its Growing Pains, 35 DEL. LAW.
16, 18 (2017).
195 See, e.g., Huff Fund Inv. P’ship, 2013 WL 5878807, at *14 (“Nothing in our jurispru-
dence suggests than an auction process need conform to any theoretical standard . . . .”).
196 See Brief of Law, supra note 48, at *2.
197 Id. at *11; see also PAUL KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 112 (2004)
(“The credibility of reserve prices is of special importance.  If a reserve price is not a genu-
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By preserving investors’ right to obtain their aggregate going-concern value
(as the appraisal statute requires), the appraisal right helps protect against
unfair and inefficient transfers to lower valuing buyers, providing more cred-
ible minimum price protection than the target’s board itself may be willing/
able to muster.
If in contrast, fair value hinged presumptively or exclusively on merger price, this
credible minimum price protection disappears.198
Essentially, the thought is that appraisal loses its ex ante value under a
merger price presumption.  Price protection in the auction process disap-
pears for a complicated set of reasons,199 but the resultant effect can be
summed up as this: “[N]o shareholder would realistically pursue appraisal
under a merger price [presumption], paying litigation expenses only to . . .
return[ ] the same price.”200  Corporations, knowing that few shareholders—
especially large, sophisticated investors—will be foolish enough to seek
appraisal in this environment, may not be as diligent as they have been in
achieving top prices for their companies.201  This would hurt shareholders
across the board by “depress[ing] both [the optimal] acquisition prices and
target shareholders’ expected welfare.”202
Although there is some risk of this decrease in expected welfare, the key
to analyzing this risk is to distinguish between appraisal petitions we do want
(those with merit) versus those brought strictly for arbitrage purposes.  If a
share price derived in a fair auction setting with adequate publicly available
information and arm’s-length dealing is the gold standard for merger trans-
actions,203 then shareholders should not get more for their shares through
an appraisal claim: they have received the fair value the market could bear.
Accordingly, the minimal risk of merger price depression204 should simply
be tolerated.
If, on the other hand, appraisal arbitrageurs challenge a transaction that
falls outside of this dichotomy or in some way questions whether the “pre-
sumption” should hold in a particular factual scenario, then the court needs
to examine other valuation methods to determine fair value, and indeed, it
has a statutory mandate to do so.205  To the extent opponents of the merger
price “presumption” are worried that the court will hesitate to consider other
valuation methods, even when faced with a transaction outside of this gold
ine commitment to not sell an object if it does not reach its reserve, then it has no meaning
and bidders will treat it as such.”).
198 Brief of Law, supra note 48, at *12 (emphasis added).
199 See, e.g., Choi & Talley, supra note 28, at 4–6.
200 Brief of Law, supra note 48, at *13; see also Choi & Talley, supra note 28, at 5.
201 See Booth, supra note 96, at 347 (noting that “bargaining happens in the shadow of
the law” and just as appraisal can drive prices up towards fairness, the absence of a robust
appraisal remedy can do the opposite); see also Folk, supra note 34, at 1293.
202 Choi & Talley, supra note 28, at 1.
203 See Huff Fund Inv. P’ship v. CKx, Inc., No. 6844, 2013 WL 5878807, at *11 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 1, 2013).
204 See Choi & Talley, supra note 28, at 1.
205 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2016).
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standard, there is cause for concern.  This is because even if suspect transac-
tions simply result in a judgment equal to the merger price, appraisal arbi-
trageurs will be disincentivized from bringing claims, even those with
merit.206  This would harm the deterrence value of the remedy, and ulti-
mately, shareholders’ welfare.
Insomuch as this concern is valid, there are steps Delaware could take to
mitigate its actuation, including increasing the reliability of its other valua-
tion methods so that they can be used more frequently.207  DCF models are,
like many models, subject to manipulation, especially when opposing experts
are trying to convince the court to accept their model after the fact.208  The
incentive when creating a DCF model during litigation is clearly to come up
with one that shows the highest (petitioner) or lowest (corporation) going-
concern value that is generally defensible.209  Rather than placing the court
in a situation where it cannot reasonably rely on either party’s DCF model
because of the staggering, indefensible differences,210 the court could
instead look to an independent expert’s objectively determined DCF model,
which could control or arbitrate some of these variances.
Although the 1976 revision of the Delaware appraisal statute effectively
replaced the role of the independent appraiser with the court itself,211 courts
do still have the ability to appoint a neutral expert witness and should con-
sider doing so in order to increase the objectivity of DCF valuations.212
Although in no way can an independent expert address all of the challenges
related to DCF reliability, appointing such an expert is a small step toward
doing so, and an important one since the DCF model remains the most
robust valuation alternative to the merger price itself.213
CONCLUSION
The appraisal statute has undergone a revolution since it was first chas-
tised as being “of virtually no economic advantage to the usual share-
holder.”214  It has evolved from a remedy to offer shareholders liquidity to
one designed to protect minority shareholders; from a remedy brought by
few, to one brought by many; and from a largely ignored statute to one that
206 See Baca, supra note 10, at 440.
207 See Huff Fund Inv. P’ship, 2013 WL 5878807, at *9 (“[T]he deficiencies of both DCF
analyses lead me to conclude that they are unreliable measures.”).
208 See 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, § 9.45[B][1].
209 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322, 2016 WL 3186538, at *45 (Del. Ch.
May 31, 2016) (observing that the experts “generated opinions that differed by 126%, or
approximately $28 billion”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob.
Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017).
210 See, e.g., id.
211 See Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 360–61 (Del. 1997).
212 See In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1222 (Del. 1992); Kenton K. Yee,
Dueling Experts and Imperfect Verification, 28 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 246, 254 (2008). But see
In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co. Inc., 114 A.3d 541, 557 (Del. Ch. 2014).
213 See Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d at 1222.
214 Manning, supra note 2, at 260.
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has captured the attention of the public.215  In the process, the remedy has
attracted much critique, mostly centered on who is bringing and buying into
these claims.
By focusing on the “who” of appraisal, however, we have lost sight of the
“why.”  We miss what social benefit these arbitrageurs do provide, and gloss
over the fact that many of these appraisal claims are in fact associated with
merit.  To ensure arbitrageurs can continue to bring these meritorious
claims, the legislature should refrain from imposing additional statutory con-
straints, particularly those related to the record date and holding require-
ments.  Indeed, the 2016 amendments—in conjunction with the court’s
trend toward relying on merger price in a fair auction setting—should do
enough to cull unmeritorious appraisal.216  But to the extent that such a
trend goes too far, to disincentivizing even worthy petitions, the court needs
to act.  Bolstering the reliability of the DCF model through appointing neu-
tral experts to arbitrate DCF valuations might be the logical next step.  But
regardless of whether the court heeds such a suggestion, the reality is simple:
appraisal still has value as a deterrence method and as protection for minor-
ity shareholders.  Shareholders need a functioning emergency switch in the
form of the appraisal remedy, and Delaware, whatever its next actions in this
space, must tread carefully to preserve it as such.
215 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 297 (noting that “[t]he relatively high incidence
of trial may be one reason for the high public visibility of appraisal, in spite of the small
number of actual cases”).
216 See Meyer, supra note 181, at 191.
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